Info:
State-owned company subordinate to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran;
Declared by Iranian authorities as the primary site for centrifuge enrichment research and development between 1997 and 2002; according to the U.N. Security Council, supplier for the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz; reportedly identified by the British government in April 2015 to the U.N. Panel of Experts as part of an active Iranian nuclear procurement network; targeted in a Stuxnet computer worm attack on May 11, 2010, reportedly as a means of spreading Stuxnet to Natanz; according to the European Union, responsible for construction of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant;
Operated in secret until 2003; was reportedly registered as a watch-making factory in Ab-Ali, 18 miles east of Tehran; began conducting centrifuge research and development in 1995; according to Iranian authorities, from 1997 through 2002, used as the primary facility for the assembly and testing of P-1 centrifuges for uranium enrichment; between 1999 and 2002, used to test centrifuges with 1.9 kg of undeclared uranium hexafluoride (UF6), reportedly imported from China; centrifuge equipment dismantled in the spring of 2003, concealed from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and stored at Pars Trash until being presented to the IAEA at Natanz in October 2003;
IAEA inspectors permitted limited access in March 2003 and full access in May 2003; modified by Iran to conceal undeclared centrifuge enrichment activities, which affected the IAEA’s ability to resolve issues related to Iran’s enrichment program; environmental sampling by the IAEA revealed the presence of highly enriched uranium particles which were not consistent with the nuclear material declared by Iran; in 2005, the IAEA found that the presence of these particles was likely caused by contamination from imported centrifuge components;
As of 2008, a research and development facility working on four different centrifuges: the IR-2, IR-3, IR-4, and IR-5; according to Iranian officials, develops centrifuge components, measuring equipment, and vacuum pumps; according to the U.S. State Department, Pishro Systems Research Company took over centrifuge research and development as of May 2013;
According to the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), company officials allegedly made trips to India and China in 2001 in search of equipment for the project;
Managing director is Majid Khansari; Raka is a department;
Entities identified as procurers for Kalaye Electric include:
Javedan Mehr Toos
Fulmen Group
Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA)
Neka Novin
Simatic Development Co
Eyvaz Technic Manufacturing Company
Negin Parto Khavar
Equipment Supplier for Nuclear Industries Corporation (ESNICO)
Hirbod Co
Yarsanat
Aluminat
Iran Cutting Tools Manufacturing
Entities identified as contractors for Kalaye Electric include:
Neda Industrial Group
Mohandesi Toseh Sokht Atomi Company (MATSA)
Tosse Silooha
Iran Uranium Enrichment Company
Also Known As:
Also Known As:
Kola Electric Co.
Kala Electric
Kola Electric Company
Kalia
Kalaye Electric Co.
Kala Electric Company
Kalay Electric Company
KEC
Involved In:
Nuclear Weapon Program
Missile Weapon Program
Country:
Iran
Address:
33 Fifteenth Street, Seyed Jamaleddin Assadabadi Avenue, Tehran Iran
33 Fifteenth Street, Seyed-Jamal-Eddin-Assad Abadi Avenue, Tehran Iran
33 15th Street, Seyed-Jamal-Eddin-Assad Abadi Avenue, Tehran Iran
Subsidiaries:
Farayand Technique
Pars Trash
Person of interests:
Majid Khansari
Reason for the color:
» Kalaye Electric Company was Iran’s primary centrifuge research and development site;
» State-owned company subordinate to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran;
» Added on Consolidated List of Financial Sanctions Targets in the UK;
» Listed in an annex to U.N. Security Council resolution 1737 of December 23, 2006, as an entity involved in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities; with some exceptions, the U.N. designation requires states to freeze financial assets on their territories which are owned or controlled by the entity, by its agents, or by entities it owns or controls; the U.N. designation also requires states to ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any persons or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of the entity;
According to the U.N. Security Council, supplier for the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz;
» Added to the Specially Designated National (SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on February 16, 2007, freezing its assets under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting transactions with U.S. parties, pursuant to Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems; on July 12, 2007, added to the U.S. “Entity List” of end users whose activities impose “a risk of diverting exported and re-exported items into programs related to weapons of mass destruction,” or that have been sanctioned by the U.S. State Department;
» Listed by the European Union on April 19, 2007, pursuant to U.N. Security Council resolution 1737, as an entity linked to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and whose funds and economic resources, and those it owns, holds, or controls, must be frozen by E.U. member states; with some exceptions, and within their jurisdiction, E.U. member states must also ensure that funds or economic resources are not made available to or for the benefit of the listed entity;