Iran’s national maritime carrier; has transported prohibited military-related cargo and facilitated shipments destined for Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and MODAFL subordinates.
Named in U.N. Security Council resolution 1803 of March 3, 2008, as a company for which cargo to and from Iran aboard vessels it owns or operates should be inspected by all states, provided there are reasonable grounds to believe that such vessels are transporting prohibited goods; named in U.N. Security Council resolution 1929 of June 9, 2010, which requests that member states communicate information on the transfer of vessels owned or operated by IRISL to other companies, and other activity that may have been undertaken in order to evade sanctions, including the renaming and re-registering of vessels; provisions of resolutions 1803 and 1929 terminated in January 2016 by U.N. Security Council resolution 2231.
Added on September 10, 2008 to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), pursuant to Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems; also added to OFAC’s SDN list in September 2008 were 123 vessels identified as property of IRISL; removed, along with its vessels, from the SDN list in January 2016 as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
Listed by the European Union on August 8, 2008, pursuant to U.N. Security Council resolution 1803; removed from the E.U. list in January 2016 as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; listed by the British government in 2015 (along with all subsidiaries) as an entity of potential concern for WMD-related procurement.
Targeted by a Temporary Denial Order (TDO), issued by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), U.S. Department of Commerce on January 22, 2009, along with Tadbir Sanaat Sharif Technology Development Center (TSS) in Iran and Icarus Marine (Pty) Ltd. in South Africa, in connection with evidence that the denied parties were about to re-export a high-performance powerboat, with U.S.-origin components, to TSS for intended use by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) navy.
Has provided logistical services to MODAFL and to its subordinate entities for the transport of military-related cargo; facilitated the transport of cargo for U.N.- and U.S.-designated proliferators, falsified documents, used generic language to evade shipping authorities, and employed cover entities to conduct official business; sought to evade sanctions by transferring nominal ownership of vessels to Starry Shine and other co-located entities (including Top Glacier Company Limited, Top Prestige Trading Limited, and Ideal Success Investments Limited) while continuing to manage and operate the ships; in 2009, handed over its container shipping services to Hafiz Darya Shipping Lines (HDS Lines); in 2007, transported a shipment of a precursor chemical destined for use at Parchin Chemical Industries in Iran’s missile program.
Main shipping activities are container transportation, bulk and general cargo transportation, shipping services in the Caspian Sea, ship management, cargo and passenger transportation, and maritime insurance services.
Source: / Iranwatch /