Capital flight from Iran is accelerating just as oil revenues decline, according to new data from the Central Bank of Iran—a convergence that helps explain the sharp fall of the national currency in recent months.
Central bank (CBI) figures show that, even before accounting for sanctions-evasion costs or discounts offered to Chinese buyers, the nominal value of Iran’s oil exports fell about 10 percent to $30.7 billion in the first half of the current Iranian fiscal year, which began on March 21, 2025.
Additional CBI data show that the nominal value of Iran’s total exports—including oil, non-oil goods and services—reached about $59 billion in the first six months of the fiscal year, while imports totaled roughly $48 billion.
On paper, that left a trade surplus of $11 billion. Yet during the same period, nearly $15 billion in capital left the country. That’s a record outflow that more than offset the surplus.
The outflows appear to be intensifying as Iran remains suspended between uncertain nuclear negotiations and the persistent risk of military escalation.
Earlier this month, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said Iranian leaders were “wiring money out of the country like crazy,” but did not offer any more details.
CBI does not specify how much revenue was lost through sanctions circumvention. But a member of parliament’s Budget and Planning Commission recently said Iran earned only $20 billion from oil exports in the first eight months of the fiscal year—far below the nominal value of shipments.
Put simply, Iran’s actual oil income over eight months was substantially lower than the nominal value of exports recorded over six months, pointing to significant losses through price discounts and restricted access to proceeds.
Even those reduced revenues have not fully reached the government. Last month, Gholamreza Tajgardoon, head of parliament’s Joint Budget Commission, said only $13 billion of the $20 billion in oil export earnings had actually been received.
The figures underscore a dual constraint: Iran is not only earning less from its oil exports but is also struggling to access the revenue it does generate, limiting its ability to finance imports or stabilize domestic markets.
The gap has forced the government to rely increasingly on domestic borrowing.
Central bank data show that by November 2025, government debt to the banking system had risen 41 percent from a year earlier, while its debt to the central bank surged 68 percent. Commercial banks’ own borrowing from the central bank rose 63 percent over the same period.
In effect, the state has compensated for lost oil income by drawing on the banking system and expanding the money supply. Liquidity—a key driver of inflation and currency depreciation—rose more than 40 percent in November 2025 compared with a year earlier.
The consequences are visible in the exchange rate. The rial has depreciated roughly 75 percent since February last year.
Taken together, declining oil revenues, restricted access to export proceeds, record capital flight and rapid monetary expansion are reinforcing one another.
The prolonged state of geopolitical limbo appears to be amplifying those pressures, encouraging businesses and elites alike to move assets abroad and leaving the economy increasingly exposed to further instability.