Iran seems to be more willing than ever to strike a deal. But not all that glitters is gold, and in this case only the black gold counts. What we are up against, in the following article in a nut shell.
People all over the world call the Trump Era, the era of deals. You either strike the deal or you’re out of the deal. And the deal is measured, for now, by the financial needs of the US. Right now, that means that the US needs to cut down on military aid: less wars is less money. Sell weapons to avoid wars and don’t pay for other people’s wars.
For the Islamic Republic of Iran, this is a one-time opportunity. The US will strike any deal that allows future administrations, but mainly this one, to calm down the Middle-East. Moreover, such a deal should allow the full renovation of the region into a more Western oriented, mostly Sunni one. One side wants to guarantee the future oil and gas flow while the other wants technological development, maybe even a leading role, to ensure that the oil producing countries will have a future, long after they have stopped to produce just that. It all makes sense, but does it make sense to Iran?
Basically, there is no doubt that Iran understands very well how the cards were played. The slippery slope of the Gaza war has shown that the self-perception of Iran is flawed. Once Iran decided to join the fighting, their proxies were mostly doomed. Hezbollah was taken apart, the leadership wiped out. The Iraqi Shiite militias took a step backwards. The Houthis in Yemen were weakened and had to make a deal with the US to survive, even if it is only temporarily. But the heaviest blow was that Turkey was allowed to take over Syria, were Iran made herself at home for decades, allowing her to feed Hezbollah, building a direct access to the Mediterranean Sea and a new frontline with Israel. A large investment of money and resources, allocation of Quds Forces on the ground – all of it gone. They probably will never make good on this investment, an investment that could have helped the Iranian people who suffer endless water shortage and blackouts, not to mention unspeakable inflation. All in vain.
There are two ways, this may go down for Iran. They either give in, go for the Trump alternative and survive on his terms or they are gambling on the general feel that Trump will avoid a war with Iran. The second alternative is a bad bet, because with all other deals working, the US administration will have freed enough resources to punish Iran. Without the proxies in case the war between Russia and the Ukraine will end in a peace agreement, the only one who will be able to stand with Iran is China, with nothing more to gain than aggravating the US.
That doesn’t mean that Iran will forfeit and join the Western alliance in song and dance. The Iranian regime is the bully, the outsider on the inside. Iran may join the deal but in such a late stage, when almost all the “goodies” were already divided between KSA, Turkey, UAE and Qatar, there is not much joy in it. Iran has not much to bring to the table, let alone to put pressure on the other participants. Such weakness will be interpreted as the beginning of the end and could lead to a regime change, either with the IRGC taking over and going for the less pragmatic option above, or at long last, with a more liberal leadership, were the clerics get a more representative status, not a governmental one. Utopian you may say, and it is!
So, for now, the Iran regime is playing for time. They try to get Europe on their side, claiming that they are willing to do almost anything they are asked for and the only thing standing in the way to peace is the irrelevancy of Western demands. This is the time and place to elaborate: The thing is, that Iran is not willing to give up on the billions of Dollars they invested in nuclear technology, because it was never meant to be used for energy only. If it were, they would have gotten several reactors that won’t allow the production of weapons plutonium, the fuel and the reprocessing by foreign companies included. Instead, they ran several clandestine nuclear projects, breeching time and again the NPT, and hindering, if not to say fooling the IAEA inspectors, if they allow them to visit the questionable sites at all. All that having been said, nuclear issues are not the only reason for sanctions on Iran. There are issues of human rights, missile technology and illegal weapons trade, and let’s not forget international terrorism. Not all sanctions are US-American, some are European or national, like by Australia. In the end, even if Iran strikes a deal with the US administration, not “all sanctions” will be lifted, but many. This leaves Iran a large set of issues to legitimately discuss and negotiate on. This takes time, and that is the only thing that counts.
One has to understand the meaning of time in the eyes of a Farsi negotiator. It shows grace, deep understanding of the gravity of the matter and a kind of honor that proves superiority. In the eyes of the Iranians, there is nothing better: The US administration wants to close a deal, and the longer it takes, the bigger is the concessions, even though Iran has no leverage at all. The longer it takes, the better the deal for Iran. In some way, negotiations are the main goal of the Iranians, while every time Iran can maintain the talks despite pressure coming from the West, any ultimatum, any threat or special sanction, is an Iranian triumph, if the negotiations are still ongoing.
It sounds surreal, contrary to Western logic but never-the-less, highly efficient. Slowly but surely Iran turns on back the heat, running terror attacks abroad, getting involved in third countries and increase repression on the inside, clearly trying to return to the arsenal they had before 2024. By the end of these negotiations the West will offer much more, Iran will have more leverage and if an agreement will still be relevant, it will be one that suits the Iranian regime interests and will not harm Iranian aspirations in the nuclear field.
So, The Iranian deal is to stall and any deal at this moment is at loss.
