On May 30, the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (Supo) officially stated that Iran is actively conducting espionage operations in Finland. Supo noted that Tehran’s objective is to obtain information on dissidents and opposition groups based abroad, often via human intelligence, to “silence voices critical of the regime.”
This marks the first time Supo has formally listed Iran among the countries suspected of spying on Finland, a designation previously reserved only for Russia and China.
The Nordic region faces a surge in Iranian plots
A Supo spokesperson cautioned that “the [Iranian intelligence operations] threat has also increased in the Nordic countries,” a sentiment that reflects concerns expressed by Swedish authorities in March 2025. The Swedish Security Police’s annual threat assessment reported on a surge in the Islamic Republic’s intelligence efforts, highlighting the regime’s increasing reliance on organized crime networks to target opposition figures and Israeli interests.
Also in March, the US Treasury Department designated the Swedish Foxtrot gang as a transnational criminal organization for carrying out attacks on Israelis and Jews in Europe at Tehran’s behest. Foxtrot’s leader, Rawa Majid, was recruited by Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence (MOI) to attack the Israeli embassy in Stockholm in January 2024. Foxtrot’s rival, the Rumba gang, carried out a separate embassy attack in May 2024, also at Tehran’s direction.
Regime intelligence operatives arrested in the United Kingdom
In two separate operations in early May, British counterterrorism police detained seven Iranian nationals suspected of orchestrating a terror plot in the United Kingdom in what the government described as the most significant “counter-state threat and counterterrorism” operation in years.
On May 17, three of the suspects were charged with targeting UK-based journalists. Having illegally entered the country, all three were granted temporary leave to remain after claiming asylum. Prosecutors allege that the men engaged in conduct intended to assist a foreign intelligence service, specifically Iran’s.
According to The National, the suspects are believed to be members of Unit 840, a covert branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) tasked with carrying out overseas missions, including abductions and terror plots. Though relatively new, Unit 840 has been linked to numerous clandestine operations across Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America, often targeting dissidents and destabilizing foreign states.
Transnational repression through criminal networks
On May 23, the US Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) issued a wanted poster for Seyed Yahya Hosseiny Panjaki, an Iranian intelligence officer with the MOI, for his involvement in global terror plots and targeting Iranian dissidents via networks linked to both the MOI and the IRGC.
Panjaki had reportedly founded the “Martyr Soleimani” headquarters at MOI, referring to the regime’s threats of avenging the US assassination of former IRGC-QF Commander Qassem Soleimani. Panjaki orchestrates various plots in close coordination with the broader IRGC and has allegedly traveled with the IRGC-QF to Lebanon and Syria to harmonize the relations between the IRGC and MOI.
The announcement also named Panjaki as the officer tasked with operating the Naji Sharifi Zindashti network, which has plotted assassinations on US soil by recruiting Canadian Hells Angles members, a gang also used by the IRGC to carry out attacks in Germany.
Citing court documents from the US and Turkey, the BBC reported on May 15 of a drastic rise in the Islamic Republic’s overseas assassination and abduction plots targeting political rivals, opposition figures, and journalists. An oft-returning theme in the report is Tehran’s growing reliance on criminal gangs—a tactic that allows the regime to distance itself from the violence it orchestrates.
The Islamic Republic’s intelligence operations against Israel
The FBI also identified Panjaki as both the deputy minister of Intelligence for Israel Affairs and the director of Internal Security within MOI—a dual role reportedly assigned by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei himself. The appointment reflects Khamenei’s strategic prioritization of offensive operations against Israel, a shift that has brought increased financial and human resources to this domain.
On May 20, Israeli authorities revealed the arrest of two citizens accused of spying for Iran in the town of Kfar Ahim, home to Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz, in what officials described as the latest chapter in an expanding Iranian espionage campaign within the country. The suspects were recruited through a Telegram group and maintained contact with Iranian handlers throughout 2025 via an encrypted messaging app and a newly acquired phone. Acting on Tehran’s orders, they carried out intelligence-gathering missions, including relocating a buried bag believed to contain an explosive device.
Iranian espionage activity in Israel surged dramatically in 2024—the same year Tehran and Jerusalem exchanged direct strikes from their own territory in April and October. More than 30 Israelis have been arrested over the past year for allegedly working on Iran’s behalf, accused of offenses ranging from photographing military sites to plotting the assassination of senior officials. According to Israel Police Superintendent Maor Goren, who leads counterintelligence efforts, the figure is unprecedented. “In past decades, we could count such cases on two hands,” Goren assessed.