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99% May harm your business future; Persons or entities that engage in transactions with this entity will be exposed to sanctions or subject to an enforcement action;
Top Alert – Entity designated / sanctioned for terror, WMD and human rights violation
Reza Sarhangpour Kafrani an Iranian national residing in Montreal, was indicted by a grand jury in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on one count of conspiracy, two counts of violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), one count of causing a failure to submit export information and six counts of money laundering. The indictment also includes a forfeiture allegation seeking all proceeds of the alleged crimes. Kafrani will be arraigned on the charges on a date to be determined by the court.
According to the indictment, Kafrani and a co-conspirator co-owned Prolife Global, Ltd., which was based in Canada, but conducted business in the United States and elsewhere. In November 2015, Kafrani began negotiating with a U.S. company to purchase mass spectrometry equipment for import to Canada. During those negotiations, Kafrani initially inquired about costs to ship and install the equipment in Montreal, Canada. Later, however, Kafrani asked a representative of the company if the installation costs were the same for the Middle East, and the representative of the company emailed Kafrani, saying, “You know there are sanctions in place for Iran.” Kafrani was unable to purchase the equipment from this company.
As alleged in the indictment, he then began negotiations with a second U.S. company for the purchase of similar mass spectrometry equipment in March 2016. Ultimately, he and a co-conspirator were able to purchase three mass spectrometers and an autosampler, used to automatically load samples into the mass spectrometer, for a total of approximately $110,739.
Chromatography and spectrometry analytical instruments, such as some of the laboratory equipment purchased by Kafrani, are controlled for nuclear nonproliferation reasons and therefore require a license to be exported from the United States to either Iran or the UAE;
On Aug. 24, 2016, Kafrani and his co-conspirator directed the second U.S. company to ship one mass spectrometer to Canada, and then coordinated with a Canadian shipping company to reexport it to the UAE on Sept. 7, 2016. From there, they arranged for a UAE-based shipping company to reexport the item to Iran on Sept. 25, 2016.
In September 2016, Kafrani and his co-conspirator arranged for a Canada-based shipping company to pick up two more mass spectrometers and an autosampler directly from the second U.S. company, transport the items to Canada and then reexport them to the UAE Kafrani then hired a UAE-based transport company to reexport the items to Iran on Oct. 11, 2016.
Kafrani never told the second U.S. company that the items were ultimately destined for Iran, causing the firm to fail to file the legally required electronic export information. Kafrani also made, or caused to be made, six separate money transfers from bank accounts in Canada and elsewhere to bank accounts in the United States with the intent to promote the unlawful exports to Iran described above. Charges of conspiracy and failing to submit export information carry a statutory maximum of five years in prison. Violations of the IEEPA and money laundering charges carry a statutory maximum of 20 years in prison. The charges also carry potential financial penalties. If convicted, a federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.
Nuclear Weapon Program
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